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A central point in Jacob’s paper focuses on the incompatibility of Grice and Mil-
likan’s account of communicative agency. First, the Gricean mindreading thesis is
incompatible with Millikan’s direct perception account. Second, the account of co-
operative  devices,  defended  by  Millikan,  contradicts  the  Gricean  separability
thesis in a broad sense. While I agree with Jacob that these positions are indeed
incompatible, I will shift focus and concentrate on issues concerning social epi-
stemology with regard to communicative agency. A main issue in social epistemo-
logy concerns the accessibility of the speaker’s reliability. How could the hearer
remain epistemically vigilant without using fallacious reasoning? (i) I argue that
the hearer, in order to be epistemically vigilant, could commit a local ad hominem
attack, a process of inductive Bayesian reasoning which is an epistemic tool for
assessing the speaker’s reliability. (ii) Compared to this, a global ad hominem at-
tack is a fallacious kind of reasoning, because it undermines knowledge transmis-
sion and it cannot be calculated in Bayes’ Theorem. (iii) The account of a local
ad hominem attack fits  with Grice’s mindreading thesis,  which is  incompatible
with Millikan’s account of direct perception. (iv) The Gricean separability thesis
could better explain occurrences of  ad hominem attacks than Millikan’s assump-
tion that speaker and hearer are cooperative devices. 
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1 Introduction: Grice’s individualistic 
account of meaning and epistemic 
trustworthiness
One of the main findings of Jacob’s paper is a
detailed elaboration of the differences between
Millikan’s  (1984,  2004,  2005)  communicative
agency  and  the  Gricean  (Grice 1957,  1969,
Sperber &  Wilson 1986)  account  of  speaker’s
meaning and intention. Jacob argues that the
Gricean  mindreading  thesis,  the  separability
thesis, and the ostensive nature of communica-
tion are not supported by Millikan’s account of
the  direct  perception  of  speaker’s  intention,
which supports a non-inferential  model  of  the
understanding of intentional signs. Furthermore,
the Gricean account is incompatible with Mil-
likan’s  claim that  speaker  and hearer  are  co-
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operative devices; the claim that the prediction
of  another’s  behavior  could  be  explained
through  reliance  on  socially  established  con-
formities and conventions and that modern de-
velopmental psychology could get along without
any theory of mind. 
A very influential account of naturalizing
the  content  of  intentional  mental  representa-
tions  is  Millikan’s  teleosemantic  framework
(Jacob 2010). According to this view, the con-
tent  of  intentional  mental  representations  can
best be naturalized by relying on the history of
the biologically-selected functions of these rep-
resentations, namely the direct proper functions
(cf.  Millikan 1984,  1989).  Interestingly,  Jacob
focuses on Millikan’s concept of communicative
agency, which is strongly connected to the tele-
osemantic framework, and argues that there are
several aspects of the Gricean individualistic ac-
count of meaning that are more plausible than
Millikan’s  when  it  comes  to  explaining  social
communicative  agency.  The  most  illuminating
finding of Jacob’s paper is the modern and pre-
cise presentation of the actuality of the Gricean
separability  thesis  and  the  mindreading  ac-
count,  because  it  is  explanatorily  fruitful  not
only for philosophy of language, but also for so-
cial cognition, social epistemology, informal lo-
gics,  and  the  relation  between  these  different
studies. 
I generally agree with Jacob’s main find-
ings, nevertheless I will address some further is-
sues of Millikan and Grice’s account with regard
to  philosophical  problems  in  social  epistemo-
logy. Before I respond to these in detail, I first
focus on the Gricean account and its implica-
tions for social epistemology.
The well-known Gricean (Grice 1957) ac-
count of the meaning of an utterance focuses on
analysis of the speaker’s meaning in a conversa-
tion. A speaker S means something unnatural if
she intends something by the utterance of a sen-
tence.1 Let  us  suppose  that  the  speaker  is  a
politician  with  a  specific  agenda  and  with  a
propensity for  aggressive  propaganda.  She  ut-
ters the following:
1 Grice (1957) distinguishes between a natural and an unnatural meaning. Un-
natural meaning is always characterized by the speaker’s intention. The nat-
ural meaning of a sign characterizes meaning that is independent of a speaker.
(1) Speaker:  “Our party will  ensure that
taxes go down”.
The speaker  S means (1) iff  S utters (1)
with the intention that a hearer H will gain the
belief that S’ party will make sure that taxes go
down,  if  (i)  the  hearer  H recognizes  the
speaker’s intention (1) and (ii) because of that
she gains the belief that S’ party will make sure
that  taxes  go down,  (iii)  since  she  recognizes
that the speaker’s intention is exactly that (cf.
Grice 1957, 1969).
Since  Gricean  meaning  is  individualistic
and subjective it is important to note which un-
derlying cognitive states constitute this mean-
ing.  As  Jacob  puts  it—relying  on  Sperber &
Wilson’s  (1986) interpretation  of  the  Gricean
account2—there  are  three  main  assumptions
upon which the psychological theory of meaning
is  based,  namely  the  separability  thesis,  the
mindreading thesis, and the asymmetry between
an  informative  and  communicative  intention.
Together with Jacob I  shall  focus on Sperber
and  Wilson’s  account,  which  argues  that  the
Gricean theory can be summarized as a recip-
rocal process of intentions. The informative in-
tention is an intention of a speaker who wants
to inform a hearer about some state of affairs.
In order to be successful, the speaker has also
the intention that the hearer recognize the in-
formative  intention  (Grice 1957).  This  means
that at first the hearer has to understand the
informative intention. If she understands it, the
communicative  intention of  the  speaker  has
been fulfilled. But the informative intention will
only be fulfilled, if the speaker is trustworthy: a
necessary condition for accepting a speaker’s ut-
terance. In effect, the hearer gains a new belief.
The assessment of her trustworthiness depends
on  the  hearer  of  that  intention  (Sperber &
Wilson 1986). She must admit that the speaker
has to be reliable in order to be trustworthy, or,
to put it in Jacob’s (this collection, p. 4) words,
“the addressee must further accept the speaker’s
epistemic or practical authority”. But a question
arises: on which kind of epistemic practices does
the hearer have to rely in order to accept the
2 I follow Jacob in relying partly on Sperber & Wilson (1986) when I
talk about the Gricean account. 
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speaker  as  an  epistemic  authority?  I  will  ad-
dress this question in the following commentary.
In order to answer it, I  will  argue that
(i)  a  hearer  could  commit  a local  ad
hominem attack,  a  process  of  inductive
Bayesian  reasoning that  secures  epi-
stemic  vigilance.  Roughly,  an  ad  hom-
inem attack  is  an  argument  that  con-
siders  rather  personal  properties  of  an
utterer  than the argument itself.  (ii)  A
fallacious kind of  the personal attack is
the global ad hominem attack, which un-
dermines  every  testimony  of  a  speaker
because  of  its  personal  traits.  (iii)  The
Gricean  account  of  mindreading  could
better account for an inductive inference
model  than Millikan’s  direct-perception-
account.  (iv)  Practices  of  ad  hominem
attacks, I will argue, support the Gricean
separability  thesis,  while  Millikan’s  co-
operative  devices  account  is  less  plaus-
ible.
The structure of this commentary will be
as follows: first, I focus on Grice and Millikan’s
framework and its  implications  for  social  epi-
stemology, namely the problem of epistemic reli-
ability  (cf.  section  2).  In  section  3 I  shall
present Lackey’s account of a social epistemolo-
gical dualism, a hybrid theory in which Lackey
tries to connect the most plausible findings of
social epistemological reductionism and anti-re-
ductionism. Then I argue that the Gricean ac-
count  of  informative  intentions  and  Lackey’s
positive reason component could lead to the per-
sonal attack or  ad hominem argument (cf. sec-
tion 4). In section 5 I argue that there are two
possible  commitments  of  ad  hominem argu-
ments, to be specific, the global and the local ad
hominem attack (cf. section 5.1, section 5.2). In
the Gricean account of the mindreading thesis is
compatible with the drawn picture of our social
epistemological  practices,  because  it  supports
the inductive inference model, while Millikan’s
account of  direct perception could not account
for  this.  The  Gricean  separability  thesis fits
nicely with the positive reasons component and
the reliance on  ad hominem arguments,  while
Millikan’s account of speaker and hearer as co-
operative devices is less plausible (cf. section 6). 
2 Epistemic intentions and epistemic 
reliability
The utterance of a speaker depends on two dir-
ections of fit. The first can be characterized as a
mind-to-world-relation.  Here,  the  speaker  has
the intention of conveying some states of affairs
about the actual world. This direction of fit im-
plies that the speaker wants to share some epi-
stemic notions. If she is successful in doing so,
the hearer will gain a true belief. This class of
utterances is descriptive.
The second is a world-to-mind direction of
fit of the speaker’s utterance. Here the speaker
wants  to  convey  some  of  her  desires  to  the
hearer, who acts in a particular way in order to
fulfill the speaker’s desire. The intention is ful-
filled if the hearer gains a new desire to act in
order to fulfill the speaker’s desire (Sperber &
Wilson 1986). This kind of direction of fit is un-
important for the following account. Here I shall
focus on descriptive utterances.
Before I address some implications of epi-
stemic intentions, I shall focus on the separabil-
ity thesis. This thesis addresses the problem of
an asymmetry of interests between hearer and
speaker.  Since  the  interests  are  not  identical,
the speaker could deceive the hearer. And the
other way around: the hearer could distrust the
speaker even though she utters a true sentence.
Sperber et al. (2010) claim that some amount of
distrust is a stabilizator in the evolution of hu-
man communication, which they call  epistemic
vigilance. Imagine that humans believed almost
everything  they  were  told.  Since  not  every
speaker has the propensity to speak the truth,
hearers  would  have  a  lower  amount  of  know-
ledge because they would have no tool for dis-
tinguishing a reliable testimony from a non-reli-
able one. Communication would be very impre-
cise,  because  knowledge  agency would  be  less
successful. Hence, epistemic vigilance is a pre-
condition  for  cooperative  communication,  be-
cause both speaker and hearer check the reliab-
ility of knowledge transition. I agree with Sper-
ber et al. (2010) that epistemic vigilance is a
Jung, M. F. (2015). Communicative Agency and ad hominem Arguments in Social Epistemology - A Commentary on Pierre Jacob.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 20(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570184 3 | 13
www.open-mind.net
feature of a source and the content of informa-
tion.3 
Let me go back to the mind-to-world-rela-
tion of fit. If the twofold account given by Sper-
ber &  Wilson (1986) is correct, the hearer has
gained  a  true  belief  (about  some state  of  af-
fairs). To count as knowledge, we have to ask
whether the true belief is justified.4 What could
count as a justification? Some social epistemolo-
gists  would  say  that  the  testimony  of  the
speaker is sufficient to count as a justification.
This is the thesis of an anti-reductionism in so-
cial epistemology which contains the claim that
the speaker must not rely on other sources of
knowledge  such  as  perception,  inference  or
memory to justify her belief (Coady 1992). A
reductionist  would say that the testimony can-
not count as knowledge without relying in addi-
tion upon other sources of  knowledge (Fricker
1995). 
In  Millikan’s (2005) account of an inten-
tional conventional sign (which is the content of
an  intentional  mental  representation),  she  as-
sumes that speaker and hearer are cooperative
devices that have co-evolved. The relationship
between sender and receiver can be character-
ized as beneficial in the long term. Millikan pro-
poses a framework, in which the descriptive rep-
resentations  describe  a  mind-world-direction,
whereas  the  directive representation  describes
the world-to mind relation. The long term bene-
ficial communicative agency between sender and
receiver characterizes a function of reproduction
of conventional signs. The direct proper function
in this particular case is that the hearer gains a
new belief.  Millikan (1984)  is  well  known for
this  teleosemantic  account that can deal  with
misrepresentations. In such a case, the proper
function remains unfulfilled. It is  unfulfilled if
the speaker fails  to cause a new belief in the
hearer  (Millikan 1984,  2005).  But  the  hearer
could  also  be  responsible  for  the  unfulfilled
proper  function  if  she  mistakenly  judges  the
speaker to be untrustworthy. The hearer is also
3 I will address this topic with respect to the ad hominem argument in
section 5.
4 I will not address Gettier cases with regard to social epistemology.
For the sake of this commentary, I will use the term  knowledge as
meaning justified true belief. Issues concerning the ad hominem fal-
lacy will concern the justification-condition.
a constitutive  part  of  the  cooperative  devices
that establish the direct proper function (Mil-
likan 1984, 2005).
3 Social epistemology: Lackey’s dualism
Before I present a more detailed account of  ad
hominem  arguments,  I  will  say  a  few  words
about social epistemology and the position that
is  presupposed  in  this  commentary.  Jennifer
Lackey’s (2006) account of social epistemology
relies upon a kind of dualism, in which she com-
bines  anti-reductionism and reductionism.  Ac-
cording  to  her,  social  epistemology  has  made
the mistake of  addressing the debate between
reductionism and non-reductionism unilaterally.
Reductionism takes epistemic responsibility and
the rationality of the hearer far too seriously,
because  the  hearer  has  to  rely  upon  other
sources of  knowledge like perception, memory,
deductive inferences, etc. The claim here is that
testimony is not a source of knowledge in the
first place, because a hearer could never know
the intentions of a speaker who held accidently
or intentionally false beliefs. In contrast,  anti-
reductionism always  focuses  on  the  speaker’s
perspective  and  her  propensity  for  credible
testimonials.  Proponents  of  anti-reductionism
claim that a large amount of our knowledge de-
pends on testimonials. We would know almost
nothing if we were as restrictive as the reduc-
tionist  claims (Coady 1992).  Lackey wants to
combine these two accounts in a kind of dual-
ism. Her dualism contains the presupposition of
the reliability of the speaker along with positive
reasons to accept the speaker’s testimony, evalu-
ated  from  the  hearer’s  perspective.  If  the
speaker utters a true sentence and the hearer
has positive reasons to trust the speaker, then
knowledge  from testimony is  possible.  Lackey
argues for the following conditional, which con-
tains three necessary conditions:5
For every speaker A and hearer B, B justi-
fiedly believes that p on the basis of A’s
testimony  that  p only  if:  (1)  B  believes
that  p on the basis of the content of A’s
5 Lackey claims that dualism accounts only for necessary conditions
for a source of knowledge. 
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testimony that p, (2) A’s testimony that p
is  reliable  or  otherwise  truth  conducive,
and (3) B has appropriate positive reasons
for accepting A’s testimony that p. (2006,
p. 170)
For the present account it is important that a
testimony, given by A, qualifies as a source of
knowledge that depends on the hearer having
positive reasons to think that A’s testimony is
reliable.  Recall  the  informative  intention  and
the mind-to-world-direction of fit, which is ful-
filled if the speaker causes a new belief in the
hearer.  The direct  proper  function  of  the  co-
operation between speaker  and hearer  in  Mil-
likan’s (1984,  2005) account would be fulfilled.
But  according  to  Lackey’s  condition  (3),  the
achievement of a new belief is only justified if
there are various  positive reasons that account
for  the  reliability  of  the  speaker’s  testimony.
Consider the account of Sperber et al. (2010, p.
379) that “the filtering role that epistemic vigil-
ance […] in the flow of information in face-to-
face  interaction”  is  an  important  feature  of
communicative agency. But which kind of filter-
ing do  they mean? In  other  words,  what  are
positive  reasons,  exactly?  Could they be  past
experiences about the reliability of the speaker
or even a group to which the speaker belongs? 
4 Ad hominem arguments and epistemic 
injustice
I claim that the Gricean account of communica-
tion supports our social practices of committing
ad hominem arguments. The committing of  ad
hominem attacks in communicative agency be-
comes patent when you look at positive reasons
in more detail. During past events of communic-
ative agency, a hearer has tested the trustwor-
thiness of several speakers on the basis of her
personal  properties  and  the  context  to  which
these  properties  have  been  related  (Lackey
2006;  Fricker 2007).  The ability  of  being  epi-
stemically vigilant emerges very early in human
development. At the age of three years, infants
already prefer testimony from a reliable source
(cf.  Clément 2010). From that age on, infants
develop a “cognitive filter that enables children
to take advantage of testimony without the risk
being  completely  misled”  (Clément 2010,  p.
545).6
Now back  to  the  example:  suppose  that
the hearer in question has been confronted with
the  testimony  of  politicians  in  the  past.  She
then hears the following sentence from speaker
S:
(1) “Our party will make sure that taxes
will go down”.
Would  you,  as  a  hearer,  believe  her?
Consider  past  cases  of  political  propaganda
and  ask  yourself  how reliable  the  politician,
the speaker, really is. At first, let us assume
you do not. You are a very skeptical person,
especially when it comes to political issues. Is
it rational to be skeptical, so are you guilty of
prejudice? Let us assume that the speaker is
surprisingly  reliable.  She  speaks  the  truth.
The party wins and reduces taxes. Have you
treated the politician in an epistemic inequit-
ably way or was it the only way to remain epi-
stemic  vigilant?  These  questions  will  be  ad-
dressed in the following sections.
The hearer who does not believe  S’ ut-
terance (1) has committed an ad hominem ar-
gument, a personal attack against the speaker.
According to Walton (2008, p. 170) “[t]he ar-
gumentum  ad  hominem,  meaning  ‘argument
directed to the man’, is the kind of argument
that criticizes another argument by criticizing
the  arguer  rather  than  his  argument.”  A
hearer takes some personal properties, such as
being  a  politician,  and  infers  that  the  ex-
pressed sentence is false. It is  prima facie ir-
relevant to consider personal traits as indicat-
ors of a false testimony t (Yarp 2013;  Walton
1998).7 Keeping Walton in mind, we are able
to generalize ad hominem attacks as follows:
6 There is further evidence in developmental psychology that speaks of
very early acquisition and practice of epistemic vigilance (cf.  Clément
2010;  Sperber et  al. 2010;  Mascaro &  Sperber 2009).
Another issue with regard to the positive reasons component in social
epistemology is the so-called  infant/child-objection.  This concerns the
hearer’s competence in evaluating the speaker’s reliability that small chil-
dren lack, which is often construed as an argument against reductionism
(Lackey 2006). For a general discussion see Lackey (2005).
7 As will be seen in section 5.1, there are some exceptions where per-
sonal properties are relevant.
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Ad hominem attack
(1) Speaker S gives a testimony t.8
(2)  The speaker’s  S property  φ is  a  negative
property with regard to trustworthiness.
(3) Speaker S has a negative property φ, which
is ascribed as relevant for her testimony  t by
hearer H.
(C) The testimony  t, uttered by speaker  S, is
false as assessed from hearer H.9 
The arguments of the speaker (implicitly
represented or  explicitly  formulated)  have not
been  challenged  seriously  by  the  hearer.  She
just considers personal traits sufficiently to re-
ject the given argument or proposition.10 The al-
legedly  suboptimal  personal  characteristics  of
the person do not provide any evidence for re-
jecting  the  proposition p.  The  hearer  neither
shows  that  the  deduction  of  the  speaker  in-
cludes fallacious reasoning nor that the premises
on which her proposition is based are wrong. In-
formal logic does not support the hearer in this
situation (Groarke 2011). Has the speaker been
treated  inequitably?  Miranda Fricker (2007)
tries to answer this question and introduces the
notion of epistemic injustice. She generalizes the
notion as follows:
Any epistemic injustice wrongs someone in
their capacity as a subject of knowledge,
and thus in a capacity essential to human
value;  and  the  particular  way  in  which
testimonial  injustice  does  this  is  that  a
hearer wrongs a speaker in his capacity as
a  giver  of  knowledge,  as  an  informant.
(Fricker 2007, p. 5)
8 I assume that a testimony t expresses an argument that contains the
relevant proposition p.
9 One could of course distinguish between a testimony and an
argument. Here I presuppose that a testimony is somehow a
conclusion  of  an  argument.  Fricker (2007,  p.  61)  supports
this view as follows: “One might be inclined to put a famil -
iar picture of justification to the fore and argue that in or-
der to gain knowledge that p from somebody telling her that
p,  the hearer must in some way (perhaps very swiftly, per -
haps  even unconsciously)  rehearse  an argument whose  con-
clusion is p.”
10 For the purpose of this commentary I will defend a weak view of pro-
positions. The utterance of a speaker expresses a proposition that is
true if it represents a state of affairs. There is of course an asym-
metry between the propositional  content of  an utterance and the
propositional content of the speaker’s belief or thought. I agree with
Jacob (1987) that it is sufficient to assume similarity between the
two. 
It fits Fricker’s generalization that the capacity
of  a  speaker  to  convey  true  beliefs  is  under-
mined. The positive reasons clause of Lackey’s
dualism also supports this step of reasoning be-
cause the character or the identity of a speaker
could be relevant for her evaluation of trustwor-
thiness in epistemic contexts (cf.  Fricker 2007;
Lackey 2006). Crucially, stereotypes and preju-
dices—based upon ad hominem arguments—are
paradigmatic  cases  of  epistemic  injustices  (cf.
Fricker 2007). But is it not rational for a hearer
to distrust our politician? Jacob (this collection,
pp. 4–5) claims that “not every speaker is (or
should be) granted equal epistemic or practical
authority on any topic by every addressee.” Re-
member that the hearer’s positive reason com-
ponent  is  a  remainder  of  the reductionist  ac-
count with regard to testimony as a justifier of
knowledge. Is it not a necessary condition for
the positive reason component to remain vigil-
ant in such contexts? If epistemic vigilance does
not play a role in this context, then Lackey’s
suggestion of the necessary condition of positive
reasons on the hearer’s side is implausible.  In
the following I shall argue that epistemic vigil-
ance is  very important and that the dualistic
account could account for it. Nevertheless, one
has to accept what I call a local ad hominem ar-
gument in order to be epistemically vigilant in
our particular case.
5 Two kinds of ad hominem attack 
In the following section I make a suggestion in
order to disarm the problem of the ad hominem
argument  with  regard  to  the  positive  reason
component. Does an ad hominem attack always
include  fallacious reasoning?  Walton (2008,  p.
170) claims that “the argumentum ad hominem
is  not always fallacious,  for in some instances
questions  of  personal  conduct,  character,
motives, etc., are legitimate and relevant to the
issue.” Even though cases of ad hominem argu-
ments might sometimes be informally fallacious,
there are some highly relevant cases in which a
particular ad hominem attack could be commit-
ted in order to remain epistemic vigilant. Since
you, as a hearer, have a set of positive reasons
—for instance being aware of the usual verbal
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espousals of politicians during an election cam-
paign—you are forced to commit a personal at-
tack. Did your reliability assessment rely on fal-
lacious reasoning? In the literature there is  a
common distinction between three types of the
ad hominem argument: the abusive, the circum-
stantial, and the  tu quouqe argument  (Groarke
2011; Walton 1998, 2008).11 These kinds of per-
sonal  attacks  describe  various  pragma-dialect-
ical  reasoning  in  interpersonal  communicative
relationships. Below (cf. section 5.1, 5.2) I want
to draw a further distinction between two kinds
of  ad hominem attack that are closely connec-
ted  to  communicative  situations  explicitly  in-
volving knowledge transmission. Hence I want
to provide a framework that fits well with social
epistemological dualism.
Before  this,  I  want  to  address  the
Bayesian argumentation model, which is presup-
posed by the following account of  ad hominem
arguments. Few things have been said about the
inductive reasoning model which is the underly-
ing  mechanism  of  an  ad  hominem attack.
Roughly, one has to consider past experiences
with  regard  to  reliability,  constituted  by con-
texts and speaker properties, to adjust this ex-
perience for future communication. Harris et al.
(2012) provide an account that fits well with an
inductive  model  of  reasoning,  because,  poten-
tially  evidence  is  not  provided  by  deductive
reasoning. They claim that the evaluation of a
proposition or a given testimony is based on an
individual’s  probabilities,  which  could  be  de-
scribed formally using  Bayes’ Theorem.  A big
advantage of  this  account is  that  it  describes
our subjective evaluations in daily experiences
very well. Often, when we are asked “do you be-
lieve  S?” we are inclined to say something like
“I am not sure. I guess not”. This could be well
explained  with the  Bayesian model,  where  an
individual’s belief does not have a truth-value of
0 or 1. The relevant belief is instead estimated
in one’s  subjective degree of  that belief,  as  a
probability between 0 and 1. Let us embed this
in  our  current  considerations.  The  utterance
type of the politician is already embedded in a
11 For  some  very  interesting  empirical  investigations  with  regard  to
these three kinds of ad hominem arguments, see van Eemeren et al.
(2000) and van Eemeren et al. (2008).
kind of bias or in posterior beliefs about politi-
cians in general: this is called the hypothesis h,
and has a particular probability  P(h)  in isola-
tion from evidence e. Evidence e in this particu-
lar case is constituted by personal characterist-
ics, properties, and circumstances of the utter-
ance.  The  receiving  of  the  new  evidence  e
should update P(h), the probability of the hypo-
thesis.  Individuals  ought,  according  to  the
normative stipulation, if they receive any evid-
ence, to let it influence the probability of the
proposition:  “[this]  normative  procedure  by
which individuals should update their degree of
belief in a hypothesis h upon receipt of an item
of evidence e is given by Bayes’ Theorem:
 “(Harris et al. 2012, p. 316)
P(h|e)  describes the conditional probabil-
ity of a hypothesis being true after one has re-
ceived evidence  e.  P(e|h) terms the conditional
probability of receiving evidence e, given hypo-
thesis h. P(e) just describes the evidence in isol-
ation from the truth-values of the hypothesis h
(cf. Harris et al. 2012).
5.1 Local ad hominem attack
I am now able to distinguish two kinds of  ad
hominem attack, a local and a global one. I will
thus sketch out some considerations with regard
to the presented Bayesian framework. 
The positive  reason component describes
the  practice  of  a  speaker’s  credibility  assess-
ment. This process of credibility assessing could
lead to what I will call a local ad hominem at-
tack. Roughly, one commits a local ad hominem
argument  if  one  acknowledges  someone  to  be
trustworthy  in  general,  but  with  some excep-
tions in particular cases. If you ask the politi-
cian what time it is or the straightest way to
the subway station, it is very unlikely that she
would have the intention of deceiving you (Sper-
ber 2001).  Hence,  one  would  count  her  as  a
trustworthy person. Nonetheless, given the par-
ticular information about her party and the re-
duction of taxes, you might find it unlikely that
she is telling the truth. As long as you do not
dismiss her in general as an eligible bearer of
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knowledge,  it  is  vigilant  in  a rational  way to
distrust her in this case. This view could be de-
scribed as a subclass of epistemic vigilance, be-
cause it is an evolved tool that minimizes the
risks of deception which is—according to  Sper-
ber et  al. (2010)—a condition for  cooperative
communicators.
At this stage, subjective Bayesian probab-
ility comes into play. The general bias of your
past  experiences  with  regard  to  politicians,
which enters the stage before you have received
the evidence, could be described with (h). The
probability of the hypothesis  P(h) is the prob-
ability of your believing her without having re-
ceived  evidence  e.  Given  (1),  evidence  e  de-
scribes that the person is a politician during a
campaign, which also has a particular probabil-
ity, termed P(e). The evidence condition is the
part that divides the local  ad hominem attack
from the global, because the evidence is able to
influence one’s subjective degree of probability.
The personal traits of the speaker as well as the
context  of  utterance-use  serve  as  evidence  e.
P(h|e) is then the conditional probability of h, if
the hearer H receives evidence e. Given the hy-
pothesis h, the probability of receiving evidence
e  is  described by  P(e|h).  As presented above,
this could be calculated within Bayes’ Theorem
(cf. Harris et al. 2012).
As you can see, the content and the source
of information, which serve as evidence  e, are
both  similarly  relevant  for  a  testimony  (cf.
Sperber et al. 2010).  Buenting (2005) calls this
kind of reasoning relevance-based with regard to
the relevant circumstances that could invoke ad
hominem attacks.  The context and content of
the utterance or proposition in question is im-
portant for assessment. Walton (1998) calls such
a context and content-related  ad hominem at-
tack a  credibility function.  The proposition in
question undergoes an  ethotic rating, a kind of
evaluation of  a person’s epistemic input value
(of her testimony), which can go up or down.
When committing a local  ad hominem attack,
the rating goes down. Hence the credibility of
the  speaker  is  undermined  in  a  specific  case
that affects the proposition, which fits with the
account of  Bayesian argumentation.  The local
ad hominem argument is an example of a non-
fallacious ad hominem attack because it is con-
tent as well as context-related and epistemically
equitable.  The  normative  stipulation  of  the
Bayesian account that a hearer “should update
[her]  probabilistic degrees of  belief  in a hypo-
thesis  in  accordance  with  the  prescriptions  of
Bayes’ Theorem” (Harris et al. 2012, p. 316) is
fulfilled  in  the  local  version.  The  take  home
message of this passage could be presented in a
more simplified way:
Local ad hominem attack (non-fallacious)
(1) Speaker S gives a testimony t.
(2) Speaker’s  S property  φ is a negative prop-
erty with regard to trustworthiness. 
(3)Speaker S has a negative property φ that is
relevant evidence  e for a hypothesis  h with re-
gard to the content of the particular testimony
t by hearer H.
(C) The testimony  t,  uttered by speaker  S,  is
probably false as assessed by hearer h. 12
5.2 Global ad hominem attack
I call the opposite kind of reasoning the global
ad hominem argument, which I claim, is falla-
cious. The hearer commits a global attack if she
does  not  believe  the  speaker  in  general.  The
hearer  discredits  her  any kind of  trustworthi-
ness. Consider some stereotypes and prejudices
that could suffice for such a radical conclusion.13
This behavior is clearly irrational, since it un-
dermines any testimony of a speaker in every
situation. As you can see, this kind of fallacy is
neither a  content-related nor  context-related ad
hominem argument.  In  distinction  from  the
global  attack,  here the content  does not  play
any role in the evaluation of the speaker’s reli-
ability. First, the evidence  e only includes per-
12 As Jacob (1987) suggests, beliefs are shared in different communities
with  different  ideological  backgrounds  that  are  themselves  con-
stitutive  of  belief-formation.  One  could  defend  that  the  local  ad
hominem attack is an important tool for running a communicative
society. If so, we would be using local ad hominem attacks as a form
of self-deception,  which would then be somehow an instance of a
shared optimism bias. I will not discuss this phenomenon any fur-
ther, because it is not a tool or cognitive filter that improves know-
ledge transmission.  Hence, positive local  ad hominem attacks, one
could argue, have at least a propensity for being epistemically unvi-
gilant mechanisms. 
13 Yarp (2013) suggests that ad hominem fallacies like prejudices could
be unconscious or at least not transparent to the hearer’s reasoning. 
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sonal traits and not the circumstances of the ut-
terance. Second, the evidence  e does not influ-
ence the degree of belief that the hypothesis h is
true. This is the reason why the belief, formed
via the process of a global ad hominem fallacy,
could not be calculated in Bayes’ Theorem. The
normative stipulation that evidence e should af-
fect the probability of a hypothesis h is not sat-
isfied. 
Another reason why this type of personal
attack is fallacious is because it includes irrelev-
ant  circumstances  and  personal  traits  as  the
basis  of  the  speaker’s  evaluation  (Buenting
2005). The speaker, as she is assessed, is not in
any way disposed to maximizing the hearer’s set
of true beliefs.14 In other words, the hearer un-
dermines  any  potential  benefit  she  may  gain
through any of the speaker’s testimony (Sperber
2001), which could be described as a paradig-
matic case of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007).
Hence,  a  general  assessment  of  the  speaker’s
credibility has nothing to do with the process of
positive reason formation. In other words, the
global  ad hominem attack is not an epistemic
tool,  because  it  lacks  any  credibility  function,
because the speaker assesses the testimony as
necessarily false, because of her personal proper-
ties. Since it is not an epistemic tool, this kind
of reasoning is not epistemically vigilant (Sper-
ber et al. 2010). To summarize: 
Global ad hominem attack (fallacious)
(1) Speaker S gives a testimony t.
(2) Speaker’s  S property  φ is a negative prop-
erty with regard to trustworthiness.
(3) Speaker S has a negative property φ that is
ascribed  as  relevant  for  every  testimony  t by
hearer H.
(C) The testimony  t, uttered by speaker  S, is
necessarily false as assessed by hearer H.
6 Ad hominem arguments and 
communicative agency
I agree with Jacob that some aspects of Grice’s
theory of meaning are in a broad sense incom-
patible with Millikan’s account of communicat-
14 I will not consider the ethical implications of this view any further in
this commentary.
ive agency. The focus of this commentary so far
has  been  communicative  agency  in  epistemic
contexts and its implications, and in particular
the personal attack. I will now evaluate whether
Millikan’s  account  of  direct  perception  or
Grice’s  account  of  mindreading  could  account
for  ad  hominem arguments  in  epistemic  con-
texts. My answer is that the Gricean mindread-
ing thesis is more plausible. I then compare the
separability thesis with the cooperative devices.
The separability thesis fits best with the prac-
tices of  ad hominem fallacies. The presupposi-
tion of cooperative devices is less plausible.
6.1 Mindreading vs. direct perception
Recall  from  section  1 that  the  mindreading
thesis relies on the twofold account of informat-
ive  and  communicative  intention.  First,  the
speaker  has  to  recognize  or  understand  the
speaker’s  informative  intention,  which  is  the
speaker’s communicative intention. For the  ful-
fillment of the informative intention, the trust-
worthiness of the speaker has to be accepted. In
other words, in order to  fulfill the informative
intention,  the  hearer  commits  neither  a  local
nor  a  global  ad  hominem argument  (or  she
would not accept it). But in order to be an epi-
stemically  vigilant  agent,  the  hearer  has  to
make some further inferences, which are induct-
ive (as well as the  ad hominem fallacies). This
inductive inference model involves some kind of
mindreading  that  could  affect  the  reliability
judgment.15 Millikan claims that the acceptance
of a given testimony as a source of knowledge is
a form of direct perception without any kind of
inference (Millikan 1984;  Sperber et al. 2010).
She talks about translation instead of inference.
The hearer translates the utterance via direct
perception into a new belief (Millikan 2004):
Forming a belief about where Johnny I on
the basis of being told where he is I just as
direct a process (and just as indirect) as
forming a belief about where Johnny is on
15 Unfortunately, I cannot address in this paper which kind of mindreading is
supported by this view and how it could perhaps be related to social cogni-
tion and mirror-neurons. For a general discussion see Jacob (2008, 2013).
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the  basis  of  seeing  him  there.  (Millikan
2004, p. 120) There is no reason to sup-
pose that any of these ways of gaining the
information that Johnny has come in re-
quires  that  one perform inferences.  (Mil-
likan 2004, p. 125) 
It is doubtable that these circumstances explain
our everyday communicative agency, especially
with regard to epistemic conversations. Accord-
ing to Millikan, the acceptance of a new belief
does  not  involve  any  representation  of  the
speaker’s intention. But in order to assess the
reader  as  benevolent  and  competent  (or  reli-
able), one has to rely—as argued in section 5—
on inductive inferences which are of course de-
rived representations manifested in beliefs about
the speaker’s intention. 
In  epistemic  contexts  of  communication
only  the  mind-to-world  direction  is  involved,
qua descriptive utterances. One criticism offered
by Jacob is that Millikan’s account of percep-
tion  could  only  account  for  descriptive  utter-
ances, hence only for the mind-to world direc-
tion.  Another  issue  is  closely  related  to  this
kind of criticism. It concerns testimony that has
very  little  to  do  with  perceptual  capacities.
With  regard  to  very  complex  utterances  like
(1),  I  agree with  Jacob (this collection,  p. 9)
that “it does not make much sense to assume
that either the speaker or her addressee could
perceive what the speaker’s utterance is about.”
Consider  the  nature  of  testimonial  reports.
Even  some  direct  perception  of  a  testimony
about some state of affairs is perceptually im-
poverished compared to directly perceiving the
state of affairs in question. Imagine some testi-
monial  reports  that  have  been  heard through
the radio. In such a case, you are not in a per-
ceptually close relationship to the reported state
of affairs. If you evaluate the credibility of the
speaker,  it  is  very  likely  that  you would  run
through  different  processes  of  inductive  infer-
ence in order to commit an  ad hominem argu-
ment or avoid one. The more abstract the testi-
mony, the more implausible it becomes that it
has anything to do with direct  perception.  It
becomes even more complicated with complex
indexical utterances or a group of different but
equally  eligible  interpretations  of  a  particular
testimony. Consider again example (1). Here it
is very likely that a hearer represents some in-
tentions of the speaker that are linked to her
psychological  states.  If  one  representation  is
that  the  speaker  could  deceive  the  hearer  in
particular circumstances, the hearer will prob-
ably  commit  a  local  ad  hominem attack.  To
sum up: Ad hominem arguments are ascriptions
that result from inductive inferences that also
depend on belief-desire psychology, because the
hearer gains a representation of the second-or-
der representation of the sentence expressed by
the speaker. The representation of the hearer is
a third-order representation of the second-order
linguistic  representation  of  the  speaker  (cf.
Jacob 1987).16 
6.2 Separability thesis vs. cooperative 
devices
The problems addressed so far are closely re-
lated to the separability thesis. The separability
thesis  is  the  claim  that  the  hearer  and  the
speaker could have different interests, which are
causes  of  the  informative  intention  remaining
unfulfilled,  because  there  are  two  cases  that
suggest  that  the  interests  of  both  parties  fall
apart. In the first, the hearer gains a new belief
that is not true, because the speaker has the in-
formative intention to deceive the hearer. So her
informative  intention  has  the  aim  that  the
speaker gains a false belief and not one about
some states of affairs, as described in section 2.
In  the  second,  the  sentence,  uttered  by  the
speaker, is true, but nonetheless denied by the
hearer on the basis of an ad hominem argument
(Sperber & Wilson 1986).17 These two cases do
not support Millikan’s (2005) claim that the in-
terests of both speaker and hearer are balanced.
If a hearer commits a global ad hominem argu-
ment, it is even harder to ascribe balanced in-
terests  to  speaker  and hearer.  Sperber (2001)
defends a plausible weak version of coincidence
of interests. It is only necessary that they over-
16 According to  Jacob (1987), a belief-ascription is not constitutive of
the subject’s belief in the first place.
17 There are, of course, plenty of other options for different interests
(cf. Sperber 2001).
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lap in the long term in order to establish suc-
cessful  practices  of  social  knowledge transmis-
sion. 
Cases  of  global  ad  hominem arguments
could only occur if a speaker understands the
informative intention which she combines with
some  particular  personal  properties  of  the
speaker in order to reject the testimony in ques-
tion. Hence the speaker succeeds in establishing
the communicative intention, but fails to fulfill
the informative intention. In Millikanean terms,
the direct proper function of the speaker is that
the hearer gains a new belief. If the hearer com-
mits an  ad hominem attack, the direct proper
function remains unfulfilled. But the communic-
ative intention is still  fulfilled, and that is all
that  is  required  for  successful  communication
according to the separability thesis of commu-
nicative  intentions  (Sperber &  Wilson 1986).
The hearer recognizes that the speaker wants to
inform her of her informative intention, which
means  that  the  communicative  intention  has
been fulfilled.  But the informative intention—
which is that the hearer gains some new inform-
ation or a true belief—fails, because an ad hom-
inem attack has been committed. This circum-
stance could be well explained with the separ-
ability thesis and the weak account of commu-
nication that  we addressed in  section  6.1.  To
sum up, and in agreement with Jacob, if an ad
hominem attack  has  been  committed,  even  a
weaker  version,  communicative  agency is  viol-
ated in the Millikan (2004, 2005) framework be-
cause the cooperative conventional transmission
is violated in the first place.18 
The picture I draw with regard to the ad
hominem arguments  rests  on  the  assumption
that trustworthiness has to be assessed by the
hearer in order to be counted as epistemic vigil-
ant, which would be the reductionist compon-
ent. On the other side, the speaker has to utter
a  true  sentence  to  transmit  knowledge  to  a
speaker,  which would be the anti-reductionist-
component. This view is supported by Lackey’s
dualism. As can be seen, the establishment of a
dualistic account and all its implications for the
18 The question, of course, is in which sense it is violated, in detail, and
how this affects Millikan’s theory of language in general. However,
these implications cannot be addressed here.
inductive  reasoning  model  can  be  better  ex-
plained with the separability thesis. 
7 Conclusion
In this commentary I have extended the refresh-
ing  account  given  by  Jacob,  who  presents
Grice’s individual account of meaning and as-
sesses its plausibility with regard to communica-
tion and knowledge transmission. I defended the
view  that  one  promising  way  to  talk  about
testimony as a source of knowledge is offered by
Lackey’s  dualism.  Here,  both  speaker  and
hearer are the important in knowledge transmis-
sion. In order to secure this transmission, the
speaker  has  to utter  a  true sentence  and the
hearer has to check the speaker’s trustworthi-
ness. I distinguished two kinds of personal at-
tack: 
(i) The local ad hominem argument, which
is not fallacious, focuses on the proposition and
personal properties of the speaker, and is a con-
tent-related, relevance-based attack based upon
one’s subjective probabilistic estimation of the
speaker’s reliability, which can be calculated in
Bayes’ Theorem. 
(ii)  The  global  ad  hominem argument,
which is fallacious, is an extreme prejudice that
denies that the speaker is reliable in any case. It
is not usable as a tool for knowledge transmis-
sion, because it violates the stipulation of the
Bayesian argumentation in which one should in-
clude some evidence in the subjective probabil-
ity estimation. This extreme kind of a personal
attack could be racism or stigmatizing, for in-
stance. 
(iii)  Here  I  argued—in  agreement  with
Jacob—that the Gricean account of mindread-
ing is more plausible than Millikan’s account of
direct perception. To use the inductive model of
reasoning when evaluating a speaker’s reliabil-
ity, one also has to rely on the use of belief-de-
sire psychology. It is important to infer the in-
tentions  of  the  speaker,  and  to  think  about
whether  she  has  good  reasons  or  a  general
propensity to speak the truth. Millikan’s frame-
work of direct perception does not account for
this,  because the direct perceptibility of  some
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abstract cases of testimony and their evaluated
reliability is very implausible.
(iv) Last, I argued that the description of
speaker and hearer as cooperative devices is im-
plausible, too. First, we know that the speaker
could  have  deceptive  intentions.  Second,  if
somebody is committing a global  ad hominem
attack, the interests of the utterer and her ad-
dressee fall apart. Nonetheless, the communicat-
ive intention still holds. Both parties communic-
ate successfully, even if the hearer does not gain
a new belief. So we could conclude with Grice
and Sperber and Wilson that the communicat-
ive intention is sufficient for a successful com-
munication.  If  the  addressee  commits  an  ad
hominem fallacy, the proper function is unful-
filled. But in this case the conventional speaker
action, which is part of successful communica-
tion, has been violated. I have argued that the
Gricean account could well explain our commu-
nicative practices regarding epistemic contexts.
In terms of  future research,  it  would be
very interesting to see, how the Gricean philo-
sophy  of  a  speaker’s  individual  meaning  and
mindreading  could  be  embedded  in  theories
about social cognition, social epistemology and
informal logics. Jacob has presented an illumin-
ating  account  of  how the  Gricean  philosophy
could  be  embedded  in  modern  philosophy  of
mind and the cognitive sciences. I propose that
one should further reflect on Jacob’s arguments
and adopt  his  conceptual  framework,  which  I
think is very precise and explanatorily fruitful.
But  for  my  own  proposal  of  a  distinction
between local and global ad hominem attacks, it
will  be important  to flesh out  these  accounts
with  regard  to  Bayesian  reasoning  and  argu-
mentation in epistemic contexts.  A good can-
didate for elaborating this  kind of  research is
the  recent  account  of  predictive  processing,
which is also based on Bayesian probabilities. 
In  this  commentary I  have  claimed that
these  personal  attacks  are  inductive  mechan-
isms. But much more could be said about their
functionality  or  even  their  instantiation  in  a
cognitive system. Then it would be interesting
to  see  if  non-human  cognitive  systems  could
commit  these  kinds  of  ad  hominem attacks.
How  precise  could  they  be  in  evaluating  a
speaker’s reliability? Are instances of  ad hom-
inem attacks bound to a specific type of brain
through which the relevant representational and
functional architectures are realized? How could
such a phenomenon like the global and local ad
hominem attack  evolve  in  homo sapiens,  and
what are the deeper underlying cognitive mech-
anisms of such attacks? These questions need to
be answered if we want to understand these im-
portant  mechanisms  and  processes  of  social
knowledge, as well as our communicative society
as a whole.
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